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The Cotonou Agreement 
 
Clara Mira Salama (College of Europe, Bruges) & Stephen Dearden (Manchester 
Metropolitan University). 
This paper reviews the process of negotiation that led to the recently signed Cotonou 
Agreement. It reviews the content of the Agreement and provides a short assessment. 
 
This paper reviews the Cotonou Agreement, the latest Convention to define the relationship 
between the EU and the African , Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of developing 
countries. This relationship began in 1957, at the inception of the European Community, 
with the Yaoundé Conventions, and was followed by the Lomé Conventions at the 
accession of the United Kingdom. Although these form only part of the EU's development 
cooperation policy it is by far the most comprehensive, covering both trade and aid, and the 
oldest. Although the EU is devoting an increasing proportion of its aid to the former Soviet 
States of Central and Eastern Europe, the ACPs continue to receive a larger proportion of 
EU aid than Asia, Latin America and the Mediterranean. The relationship with the ACP 
countries has evolved from colonial special associate status (AAMS: Associated African 
States and Madagascar), to independent Associated States, to partners under Lomé. The 
Lomé Agreements were of five years, except Lomé IV, which was of ten years but with a 
mid-term  review. This allowed them to adjust to the changing socio-economic conditions 
of the ACPs, the EU and the international environment. Lomé IV bis expired on 29 
February 2000. Its Article 366(3) stated that negotiations leading to the renewal of the 
agreement should start “eighteen months before the end of the total period of the 
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convention”, that is, in September 1998. A number of changes in the international situation 
required a significant revision of the relationship. 
    The fall of the Communist bloc and the end of the Cold War brought fundamental 
changes in the international arena. Democracy and the market economy became the 
dominant ideology, with many ACPs embracing democracy. Another result of the 
fragmentation of the Communist block was the emergence of new states many of whom 
wished to join the EU. These countries confronted serious difficulties in their transitions to 
the market economy and to a democratic system and the EU considered it  its duty to assist 
them in this sometimes painful process. New aid programs to foster Eastern and Central 
Europe States´ development have been created, such as PHARE and TACIS, and they also 
enjoy preferential access to the Community market according to the terms and conditions of 
their corresponding Europe Agreement1 .   
   Meanwhile the world was also becoming more globalised and interdependent but the 
developing countries appeared to be the main losers in this process, with a declining share 
of world trade, investment and production. Africa in particular has performed badly. 
Another important change has been the growing concern about human rights. Lomé IV and 
IV bis already introduced some provisions in this area, but there was a desire to develop the 
provisions, emphasising the principles of democracy and good governance. The new 
agreement was expected to seriously address this issue. Finally there has been the need to 
comply with the WTO rules. In 1997 the Dispute Settlement Panel of the WTO ruled that  
the banana regime was not compatible with the principles of the Most Favoured Nation and 
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 According to the words of Lord Plumb, European co-President (EPP) “Europe’s interest in the 
South is inversely proportional to its growing interest in Central and Eastern Europe. This link must 
be broken” (The Courier, No 167, January-February 1998). 
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reciprocity. After other problems that the Community had faced in the WTO it was clear 
that the new ACP-EU agreement had to be compatible with WTO´s rules. 
  The poor outcome of the Lomé system had also underlined the need for reform.  The 
funding under the successive EDFs and the STABEX scheme and the trade preferences did 
not prove to be sufficient to promote development in the ACPs. These unsatisfactory results 
had contributed to the creation of a crisis of legitimacy amongst the donors and “aid  
fatigue”. 
   In response the EU is undertaking a reform  process to improve the quality, impact and 
management of its development co-operation policy. The Treaty of Maastricht, in the new 
title of development co-operation, outlined the principles that this policy should follow, 
which are those of complementarity between the Member States and the EC development 
co-operation policies, co-ordination2 and coherence, such that all the EC policies take into 
account the EU’s development objectives. The Treaty of Amsterdam added the principle of 
consistency in all of the activities of the EU in the external relations field. To ensure 
compliance with these principles the Commission elaborated several Communications and 
the Development Council adopted resolutions3. Other possible reforms are being 
considered to try to improve the effectiveness of EC development aid. The EC delivers 
more than 10% of total ODA,  and together with its member states it provides about 55% of 
total ODA, but this enormous increase in the amount of aid has not been accompanied by a 
similar increment in staff. Staff shortages, too rigid and centralised procedures, insufficient 
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 According to van Reisen (1999) about 3 billion euro is annually lost because of insufficient co-
ordination EC-Member States. 
3
 On co-ordination, there was a communication from the Commission of 3 May 1995 and initiatives 
launched by the Development Council (Development Co-operation Policy in the run-up to 2000); on 
coherence, Resolution 8631. 
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programming and lack of strong monitoring and evaluating procedures are among the 
reasons cited for this poor performance.  
    A Communication to the Commission on the Reform of the Management of External 
Assistance (Brussels, 16 May 2000) describes the major reforms to be undertaken. 
Important administrative changes are outlined, the project cycle is unified and 
responsibilities are distributed differently; its six stages (programming, identification of 
projects and actions, appraisal, financing decision, implementation, evaluation) which until 
now have been split between DG RELEX, DG DEV and the SCR4 will now be shared 
between the geographical Directorates-General and a new implementing body, which 
initially will be built on the SCR. A Quality Support Group will be created to evaluate and 
monitor the results of the projects. It is expected that through these reforms the quality and 
impact of EC aid would be improved. 
 
 The  Negotiating Positions. 
 
The European Community 
The Commission published a discussion paper in 1996 -the Green Paper- to promote 
dialogue and discussion on the subject. A Commission Communication was issued in 
October 1997, in which the major policy guidelines for future EC-ACP relations were set: 
- to provide the new partnership with a strong political dimension 
- to make poverty reduction the main co-operation aim 
- to open up co-operation to economic partnership 
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 The SCR is the Joint Service for External Relations, established in 1998 to implement and 
evaluate the projects. 
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- to manage financial and technical co-operation more selectively and rigorously. 
- to respect the unity of the ACP as a group but develop geographical differentiation. 
  The Council, after analysing the proposal of the Commission for the negotiating mandate 
in an ad-hoc post-Lomé group and COREPER, issued the negotiating directives on 29 June 
1998, under the British presidency. Most Member States accepted this mandate5. The 
negotiating mandate was structured around three main subjects: a) political dialogue, b) 
development co-operation and c) trade and economic co-operation.  
Concerning political dialogue, the EC insisted on strengthening dialogue in all matters of 
common interest, including human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance. 
Violations of these principles would lead to the suspension of co-operation (the non-
execution clause). In the development co-operation field, the cornerstone of the proposal is 
the eradication of poverty.  
   With trade and economic co-operation, the EU recognises that the Lomé system of non-
reciprocal preferences has not been as beneficial as expected. Therefore it proposed the 
negotiation of co-operation and regional economic partnership agreements (REPAs) with 
groups of the ACPs, establishing free trade areas6. These agreements would be negotiated 
and the necessary reforms in the ACPs undertaken in the five years following the signature 
of the new agreement, coming into force in 2005. In the meantime another five-years 
waiver would be negotiated in the WTO. Besides this main option the EU proposed to open 
its market, almost completely, to all low-income developing countries (39 of the 71 ACP 
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 The UK and the Netherlands were not so convinced on one of the main points of the mandate, the 
establishment of Regional Economic Partnership Agreements (REPAs). A Community co-ordination 
meeting had to be held on 29 July 1999 to discuss the topic. 
6
 See n.5 above. 
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countries are considered LDCs) and to allow for different agreements with non-LDCs that 
consider they are not in a position to negotiate and implement a REPA.  
 
The ACP States. 
The first summit of ACP Heads of State and Government was held in Libreville, Gabon, in 
November 1997. The negotiating mandate of the ACP group is based upon the Libreville 
Declaration, and subsequently the Santo Domingo Declaration, adopted on the 26th 
November 1999. In regard to political co-operation the ACPs were willing to widen and 
strengthen the political dialogue, including themes of interest to the ACP such as conflict 
prevention, immigration of ACP nationals to the EU and the environment7, while stating 
their adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good 
governance. Nonetheless they opposed the use of these principles by the EU to suspend 
development assistance unilaterally or render  it conditional. In terms of development, the 
need to eradicate poverty was accepted as the main aim of the convention.  
With regard to trade, while recognising that non-reciprocal preferences could not be 
permanently maintained, the ACP asked for a transitional period of ten years before they 
had to face the challenge of free trade with the EU.  After this period the ACP suggested 
the maintenance of non-reciprocal preferences for all the low income ACPs. It remained to 
be seen what kind of arrangements would be made for the non-LDC´s during the 
transitional period. The option of free trade arrangements would be considered, but the GSP 
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 Para. 14 of the ACP Group Negotiating Mandate, Brussels, 30 September 1998, gives a longer 
enumeration of these areas, including EU-third country relations which adversely affect the interests 
of the ACP, greater participation of the civil society and private sector, humanitarian aid and food 
policies, arms trade, nuclear testing, drug-trafficking, money laundering, corruption, ethnic 
discrimination. 
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is regarded as “unattractive to the ACP” (para. 44). They also proposed the maintenance of 
commodity protocols and an improved STABEX and SYSMIN. 
    Both parties wanted a convention which was clearer and more flexible. As can be seen 
from both parties´ negotiating positions there was also considerable agreement on the 
development strategies, on the objective of poverty eradication and also on the 
enhancement of the political dialogue. Differences arose in the context of trade co-
operation and the introduction of good governance as an essential  element which could 
lead to the suspension of the assistance. 
 
 
 I. The Negotiating  Process. 
 
The negotiations were formally launched on 30th September 1998, in accordance with 
article 366(3) of Lomé IV bis. During the negotiations the ACP showed strong solidarity, 
despite its internal differences. Four negotiating groups were established; the Central 
Group, in charge of Political and Institutional Matters and co-ordination; Group 2 Private 
Sector, Investment and other Development Strategies; Group 3 Economic and Trade Co-
operation and Group 4 considering Financial Co-operation. Three Ministerial Negotiation 
Conferences were held in Brussels on 29-30 July 1999, 7-8 December 1999 and 2-3 
February 2000. 
  The fundamental principles of the EC-ACP partnership, such as equality between the 
parties, respect for sovereignty, ownership of the strategies by the countries concerned and 
differentiation, were relative uncontroversial issues. However other topics proved more 
contentious. 
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   Both parties agreed to intensify the political dialogue so as to cover all areas of concern 
for the parties. In this context the essential elements of the partnership had to be agreed. 
Human rights, democracy and the rule of law were accepted, but the EU insisted on the 
inclusion of good governance which the ACP rejected  because of its links with the non-
execution clause8; for the EU the violation of one of the fundamental principles could entail 
the suspension of assistance. For the ACP it was necessary to ensure that no unilateral 
measures were undertaken by the EU under this clause without a consultation procedure in 
which political dialogue would be respected and the principles and procedures for these 
consultations clearly defined. They also considered that democracy and the rule of law 
already constituted good governance and that therefore there was no need to add a fourth 
essential element. It was not until the 7-8 December 1999 Brussels Ministerial Conference 
that agreement was reached. In this session “good governance” was defined as the 
transparent and responsible management of public resources for the purposes of equitable 
and sustainable development (this is now Article 9(3) of the new agreement). Good 
governance will not be considered an “essential” element but a “fundamental” which does 
not trigger the non-execution clause in itself, only in “serious cases of active and passive 
corruption”. Thus two procedures were adopted, one for consultation and adoption of 
measures in case of a violation of one of the essential elements (human rights, democracy 
and rule of law) and another for the violation of the good governance fundamental element. 
    The different positions concerning trade were probably the main difficulty to reconcile in 
the negotiations. Both parties agreed that the existing situation could not be sustained and 
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 Mr. Adamou Salao, Minister in charge of the development, from Niger, told The Courier: “Neither 
the ACP nor EU states are against good governance. The main contention concerns its inclusion as 
an essential element in the future agreement  (...) none of the ACP countries want to see good 
governance become an essential element, which if violated would trigger the non-execution clause 
and potentially lead to sanctions”. The Courier, No. 177, October-November 1999. 
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that it was necessary to bring the system into line with WTO requirements. But from the 
very beginning controversy about the transitionary period arose; while the EC suggested a 
five-year period the ACP argued that they needed ten; the EU-ACP Joint Assembly 
supporting the ACP position9. Both parties decided to work together in the WTO to obtain a 
new waiver since the current one was due to expire with Lomé IVbis, in February 2000. 
The Dakar ministerial conference confirmed the need to reform the system and encouraged 
the negotiators to consider all the possible alternatives, such as regional economic 
partnership agreements (proposed by the EU) and GSP. Studies showed that the natural 
regions to establish the REPAs would be the Caribbean (based upon the existing 
CARICOM), the south of Africa (based on SACD), Occidental Africa (ECOWAS), 
Oriental Africa (COMESA) and maybe the Pacific. Individual agreements could probably 
be made with countries such as Nigeria, besides the already existing free trade area with 
South Africa. Negotiations will start in 2002 and the new agreements completed by 2008 at 
the latest, with a review of the situation in 2004 and in 2006. A further transitional period 
for the implementation of the agreement can run for up to  twelve years. The content of the 
Agreements and their geographical coverage is not defined, although REPAs are the 
principal option. The EU is prepared to consider different alternatives for those non-LDCs 
who consider that they are not in a situation to implement a partnership agreement. Holtz 
(2000) has argued that the failure of the WTO conference in Seattle made the EU more 
receptive to the consideration of other options. The EU will grant free access to its market 
to all LDCs by 2005, while both parties will try to obtain a waiver from the WTO to cover 
the preparatory  period.   
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 In its Nassau (Bahamas) meeting of 11-14 October 1999 it stated that the EU´s offer is 
“impractical, inequitable and will lead to increased poverty and social tension” (para. 4 of the ACP-
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   Both parties agreed that there is a need to achieve a more flexible and rational system. To 
this end they favoured decentralised decision-making and local ownership of the projects. 
But the EU considered that the number of instruments should be reduced and a new rolling 
system of programming established. This rolling programming system allows for the 
periodical revision of the allocations and strategies. The EU argued that resources should be 
allocated according to needs and performance. The ACP was concerned about the 
performance criteria,  considering that if political performance was included as a resource-
allocation  criteria, and also to set in motion the non-execution clause, this would entail 
conditionality. At the same time they expressed the views that this system would undermine 
the predictability principle which is one of the basis of the Lomé acquis. A compromise 
solution was reached; there would be an initial resource allocation according to a joint 
assessment of needs and performance and this figure would be reviewed jointly every two 
years, on the basis of these results the allocations could be changed  
    The maintenance of STABEX and SYSMIN, as the ACP requested, was another focus of 
debate, with agreement only reached in December 1999. STABEX and SYSMIN were 
relinquished by the ACP group, but arrangements were made to provide for additional 
resources in case of short-term fluctuations in export earnings followed by the worsening of 
public finances. 
    Six new members from the Pacific have joined the partnership: The Federated States of 
Micronesia, The Republic of Marshall Islands, Palau, Nauru, Cook Islands and Niue. Cuba 
was expected to become the seventh new member, but her position is more complicated. 
Since 1997 voices in the Caribbean started  suggesting the accession of Cuba to the Lomé 
Agreements. In May 1998 Cuba received observer status in the ACP Group and the same 
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status was granted for the negotiations leading to a new EC-ACP Agreement by the EU 
Council, at the insistence of Spain, on 29 June 1998.  At the conclusion of the negotiations 
the Cuban authorities made an application to sign the Convention by a Verbal Note (2nd 
February 2000). But before the decision was to be taken on the 26th April 2000, Cuba 
formally withdrew her petition. In the words of the Granma Cuban newspaper this was a 
consequence of the discriminatory  treatment that it was suffering from the EU, which had 
sent the ‘troika’ to visit the country on a fact-finding mission before making a decision. 
This procedure had never been used before, argued the Cuban authorities, whom believed 
that the EU was trying to set conditions on the Cuban accession to the Convention. Other 
commentators believe that the cause of the withdrawal was  the need to avoid a rejection of 
the application. Although apparently the end of the process,  in August a delegation of the 
ACP countries headed by the President-in-Office of the ACP Council of Ministers, visited 
Cuba10. This mission showed the solidarity of the ACP group towards the island and stated 
that she would become a full member of the ACP group after the necessary modifications 
to the Georgetown Agreement. The Cuban authorities informed the ACP mission that they 
were still willing to sign the Cotonou Agreement  provided that the EU does not impose 
any prerequisite conditions on the island. Membership would offer Cuba considerable 
benefits and mark the beginning of a new era in her bilateral relationships with the EU, 
with the social, economic and political advantages that can derive from  it. 
The convention was to have been signed in Fiji, on June 8th 2000, but because of the 
political situation in the country it had to be moved to Benin, being signed in Cotonou on 
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 The mission spent three days in Cuba (3 to 5 of August 2000) and amongst its members were the 
former ACP Council President, Mr. John Horne, Minister of Trade of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines; the Chairman of the Committee of Ambassadors, Mr. Almand Guy Zounguere-
Sokambi (Central Africa); the former Chairperson of the Committee of Ambassadors Mrs Yolette 
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the 23rd June 2000.  The abandonment of the Lomé title, after twenty five years, reflected 
the desire to indicate the fundamental nature of the changes in the relationship between the 
EU and the ACP states that the new agreement represented. 
 
II. The Cotonou Agreement 
 
The Agreement signed in Benin, the 23rd of June 2000, is structured in six parts, preceded 
by a Preamble and followed by six Annexes, three Protocols and a Final Act. These parts 
are the following: Part 1: General Provisions; Part 2: Institutional Provisions; Part 3: Co-
operation Strategies; Part 4: Development Finance Co-operation; Part 5: General Provisions 
for the Least-Developed, Landlocked and Island ACP States; Part 6: Final Provisions. The 
Agreement will enter into force two months after the deposit of the ratifications of all EC 
Member States and at least two-thirds of the ACP states and of the instrument of approval 
by the Community (Article  93). It will cover a twenty years period, commencing on 1 
March 2000 with financial protocols of five years of duration. Every  five years it will be 
possible to review the provisions of the Agreement  if requested by the Community and 
Member States or the ACP states (Article 95). 
    The objectives of the agreement are stated in Article 1, the principal one being the 
reduction and eventual eradication of poverty. In addition  “the gradual integration of the 
ACP countries into the world economy” and “sustainable development” are also to be 
pursuit, while it will  “take account at the same time of the political, economic, social, 
cultural and environmental aspects of development”. Other objectives are mentioned in this 
                                                                                                                                                     
Azor Charles (Haiti) and the Secretary General of the ACP Group, Mr. Jean Robert Goulongana 
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opening Article which are developed further in the agreement (i.e. promotion of economic, 
social and cultural development, regional and sub-regional integration processes, gender 
issues, democracy and functioning of the market. 
    The fundamental principles of the Agreement are stated in Article 2; they are the equality 
of the partners, ownership of the projects by the actors concerned and definition by the 
ACP of their development strategies, participation of non-state actors, the pivotal role of 
dialogue and differentiation and regionalisation.     
   The Agreement introduces as an important innovation a chapter about the actors in the 
partnership11. Apart from the central government this includes the local and regional 
authorities and civil society “in all its forms” (Article 6(1)b) and the private sector. 
According to Article 4 non-State actors will be involved in the development process, 
“where appropriate”, through information and consultation on co-operation policies, 
strategies, priorities and political dialogue; they would be provided with financial resources 
and capacity-building to reinforce their capabilities, and encourage and support their 
creation;  they will also be involved in the implementation of the projects. 
   Political dialogue is emphasised in the Agreement. According to Article 8 “The Parties 
shall regularly engage in a comprehensive, balanced and deep political dialogue leading to 
commitments on both sides” (8(1)). Through this mechanism the parties will exchange 
information and discuss the objectives of the Agreement and any other matter of mutual or 
general concern; mentioning as examples the arms trade, excessive military expenditure, 
drugs and organised crime, ethnic, religious or racial discrimination, the promotion of 
peace and prevention of violent conflicts and the respect of human rights, democratic 
principles, the rule of law and good governance. As the topics show, the material scope of 
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the political dialogue is very broad. To expand even more its operational field, Article 8(6) 
states that it will be conducted flexibly, formally or informally, in the institutional 
framework but also outside, allowing for the participation of regional,  sub-regional 
organisations and representatives of the civil society (Article 8(7)).  
    The essential elements of the Agreement are mentioned in Article 9; human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law will be promoted and supported. If one of these essential 
elements is violated this may trigger  a consultation mechanism established in Article 96. 
According to this scheme the Party who considers that the other one has failed to fulfil an 
obligation on these topics shall provide that Party and the Council of Ministers with 
information and invite the Party to participate in consultations. The consultation process is 
not defined (“at the level and in the form considered most appropriate”) in contrast to Lome 
IV, (Article 366a of Lomé IV bis). Only a temporal limit is set: consultations have to start 
within 15 days after the invitation and finish within the following 60 days. Experience 
showed that the previous 30 day period was too short. The rest of the Article defines what 
could be done in cases of special urgency, if consultation is refused and if a solution is not 
achieved. The ACPs fought hard against the clause allowing for unilateral action in cases of 
special urgency, but without success. What they have achieved is the introduction of 
detailed definitions of “cases of special urgency” (“exceptional cases of particularly  
serious and flagrant violation of one of the essential elements ...that require an immediate 
reaction”) and of “appropriate  measures”, stating that these measures should be undertaken 
in accordance with international  law, be proportional to the violation and “priority  must be 
given to those which least disrupt the application of this agreement”. Aid suspension is 
considered a measure of last resort, as already stated in Lomé IV bis (Article 366a). If a 
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Party is going to use this procedure then it has a duty to inform the other  and the Council 
of Ministers “unless it does not have the time to do so” and if measures are adopted they 
have to be notified immediately to the other Party and the Council of Ministers. The 
Agreement allows the ACP to comment on the measures imposed on them, although a 
posteriori.  
    Good governance is considered a fundamental element -not an essential one- as a 
compromise solution after tough discussions. It has been defined as “the transparent and 
accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the 
purposes of equitable and sustainable development” (Article 9(3)) and the non-execution 
clause will be set in motion only in “serious cases of corruption, including acts of bribery”. 
Article  97 establishes a procedure to deal with these violations which differs from that 
established for violations of the essential elements: consultations would be held in a time 
limit of 21 days after the invitation to hold them and a maximum of 60 days, but sanctions 
can be imposed only in very serious cases affecting the management of significant funds 
provided  by the Community.  
    Importantly  Article 12 states that the Community should inform the ACP Secretariat of 
any intended action that might “affect the interests of the ACP States, as far as this 
Agreement’s objectives are concerned” and that consultations may be held to ensure the 
coherence of Community policies and analyse the impact they may have on the Agreement. 
The parties also agreed to co-operate in peace-building policies, conflict prevention and 
resolution (support for mediation, negotiation, reconciliation  efforts) in Article 11. 
   The polemic issue of migration is addressed in Article 13. The first paragraphs of the 
article deal with legal migration, reaffirming the right of fair treatment that legal migrants 
enjoy and the equal treatment of ACP workers in a EU Member State and vice versa. The 
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EU has committed itself to supporting the training of ACP nationals, supporting the 
economic and social development of the regions from which migrants originate and 
facilitate  access to education for ACP students. The issue of illegal immigration was more 
delicate and controversial. There is a commitment from both parties to accept the re-
admission of any of its nationals residing illegally in the other party’s territory, but the EU 
did not succeed in introducing the same provisions about stateless persons or third country 
nationals. Bilateral agreements will be negotiated governing this specific topic at the 
request of any Party; ie.  the Community, any of its Member States or any ACP State. 
    As far as the institutional structure is concerned, the three main institutions - the Council 
of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly – are 
maintained. The Council of Ministers (members of the Council of the European Union, of 
the Commission and a member of the government of each ACP State) is responsible for 
policy guidelines, it is also responsible for the political dialogue and the consultation 
mechanisms. The Committee of Ambassadors is given specific powers for the first time: 
besides its task to assist the Council of Ministers it will also prepare for the Council 
sessions (Article 16). The Joint Assembly is now called the Joint Parliamentary Assembly 
to emphasise the parliamentary origin of its members, although its composition has not 
changed: members of the European Parliament and members of the Parliament of the ACP 
states or their delegates. It remains a consultative body, having amongst its functions the 
adoption of resolutions and recommendations to the Council of Ministers (Article 17).  
    Part 3 of the Agreement addresses the  “Co-operation strategies” including Development 
strategies (Title I) and  Economic and Trade Cooperation (Title II) , which are considered 
“interlinked and complementary”(Article 18). 
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   In development the main objective of the Agreement is poverty reduction and ultimately 
its eradication. This aim will be pursued according to the individual circumstances of each 
ACP country, promoting local ownership of the reforms and the involvement of the private 
sector and civil society in the development process. Non-state actors and the Government 
should initiate consultations to establish country development strategies. The targets and 
conclusions of the UN Conferences and other international level commitments will be 
respected (Article 19). 
   To achieve the central aim of the Agreement an integrated approach will be set in motion; 
with strategies including economic, social, cultural, environmental and institutional 
elements. Specific strategies and programmes are not outlined in the Agreement: they will 
be identified in “a compendium providing policy guidelines in specific areas or sectors of 
co-operation”. These texts may be modified and adapted to the changing circumstances by 
the Council of Ministers (Article 20). This innovation is aimed at introducing flexibility  in 
the management of development co-operation. Therefore the articles of the Agreement 
about development simply state the specific fields of co-operation and establish some 
means of co-operation and support structured around four areas: economic development, 
social and human development, regional co-operation and integration and thematic and 
cross-cutting issues. 
    Article 21 states the need to support and improve the environment to promote private 
investment and the development of the private sector through the promotion of public-
private sector, development of entrepreneurial skills, support of financial and non-financial 
services to enterprises, of microenterprise development and technical support. Article 22 is 
concerned with macroeconomic and structural reforms and policies, stating that to achieve 
macroeconomic growth and stability the ACPs will work towards “disciplined fiscal and 
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monetary policies” and an improvement in the external and fiscal balances, managing the 
budget more transparently and efficiently. It remains the responsibility of the ACPs to 
determine the direction of their development and the design of the necessary reforms. 
Assistance will also be provided in a number of areas, such as agricultural production, 
water resources and fisheries, rural strategies, infrastructure and services (transport, 
telecommunication systems, communication services and information society), mining and 
energy, trade, finance and banking, scientific, technological and research infrastructure and 
services, and tourism. Concerning the latter, Article (24) develops it further, emphasising 
the  growing importance of tourism in the economic development of the ACPs and the need 
to cooperate in the support and improvement of the sector. It was only after tough 
negotiations that the ACPs, at the very end of the negotiating process, succeeded in the 
inclusion of such a clause, tourism being “the largest industry in the region and the second 
largest in the world”, according to the Executive Director of the Caribbean Council for 
Europe, David Jessop12. 
   Social and human development includes co-operation in social sector policies (Article 25) 
in an effort to ensure “access to basic social infrastructure and services” and mentions 
explicitly education and training, health systems, nutrition, family planning, prevention of 
female genital mutilation, fight against HIV/AIDS, access to safe water, shelter, respect for 
basic social rights and social dialogue; youth issues and childrens’ rights (Article 26) and 
culture (Article  27). 
    Regional Co-operation and Integration is strongly supported and promoted in the 
Agreement. Co-operation in this field will be aimed at fostering the gradual integration of 
the ACPs into the world economy, accelerating co-operation amongst regions, promoting 
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free movement of persons, goods, services, capital, labour and technology and the 
diversification and promotion of trade.  
    The thematic and cross-cutting issues refer to three main topics -gender equality, 
environmental sustainability, institutional development and capacity building- into which 
the principle of mainstreaming is introduced  (Article 20(2)). Under the Agreement every 
single development programme or strategy will have to consider its effects upon these 
objectives.   
   The Trade Co-operation Title introduces significant changes in the trade relations 
between the EU and the ACP. The Agreement itself  that it creates “a new trading dynamic 
between the Parties”, and that the new system is to be implemented “in full conformity with 
the provisions of the WTO” (Article 34(4)). The main objective of co-operation in this field 
is to foster “the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy” 
(Article 34(1)) and to make it easier for them to “manage the challenges of globalisation” 
and to facilitate “their transition to the liberalised global economy” (Article 34(2)). The 
detailed regime has not been outlined; the new Agreement  establishes only an ‘agreement 
to agree’ at a later stage on the future arrangements. 
    Economic partnership agreements, consisting mainly of the reciprocal removal of 
barriers to trade between the parties, will be negotiated between the EU and the ACP 
regions or countries who consider themselves in a position to do so. South Africa is 
excluded from these provisions because it has its own trading regime (a Free Trade 
Agreement approved in March 1999). Negotiations will start in September 2002,  progress 
reviewed in 2006 and completed in December 2007 at the latest. The trade measures of the 
agreement applied from the 1st March 2000 according to the transitional measures adopted 
on 29 February 2000 by the Committee of Ambassadors. The preparatory period, during 
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which negotiations would be conducted will be governed by the same rules contained in 
Lomé IV bis: Annex V (“Trade regime applicable during the preparatory  period referred to 
in Article 37(1)”) states that ACP´s products will enter the Community market free of 
customs duties, charges having equivalent effect, quantitative restrictions or measures 
having equivalent effect.  A new waiver to cover this period has been requested from the 
WTO (April 2000) to obtain an exemption from compliance with Art.I.1 of GATT. It 
would be a general waiver under Article IX:3 of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the 
World Trade Organisation, requiring  a 75% majority  of the members to be granted, 
although in practice these kind of decisions are taken by consensus. The new Regional 
Economic Partnership Agreements (REPAs) shall enter into force in January 2008, 
although they can establish a transitionary period which may last 12 years, that is, 2020. 
The negotiations will be flexible and entail the review of the rules of origin and the 
asymmetrical  dismantlement of the tariffs (Article 37(7)). 
    The ACP countries who are low income developing countries (LDCs) - currently 39 
more than a half of the ACP group and two thirds of ACP sub-Saharan African countries 
(ECDPM, 2000)) - will receive a different treatment. The Community will provide duty 
free access for almost all products coming from all LDCs through a process that will start in 
year 2000 and completed by 2005 at the latest (Article 37(9)).  
    For the remaining countries who, after consultations with the Community, do not 
consider themselves in a position to negotiate REPAs, the Community will review their 
situations in 2004 and an undefined alternative WTO compatible solution will be provided 
(Article 37(6)). 
    A new body, the Joint Ministerial Trade Committee, has been established by Article 38, 
composed of representatives of both parties and in charge of following the multilateral 
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trade negotiations, examining their impact on ACP-EC trade and development and making 
recommendations. 
   The likely impact of the establishment of REPAs remains uncertain. The Commission 
funded a number of independent impact studies of REPAs, particularly on six regional 
grouping – CARICOM (Caribbean), EAC (East Africa), the Pacific, SADC (South Africa), 
UDEAC-CEMAC (Central Africa) and UEMOA (West Africa)). The results were rather  
inconclusive because of the varying assumptions of the studies, the different  
methodologies employed and the poor quality of the ACP data, but they did suggest that 
trade diversion would occur, mainly in SADC13. For the Pacific region a REPA does not 
seem to be beneficial, while the EAC could obtain some gains in exports but experience 
some losses in terms of producer costs and tariff revenues.  
    Another fact that has to be born in mind in regard to REPAs is that for a Free Trade Area 
(FTA) to be compatible with the WTO it has to cover “substantially all the trade” between 
the parties. The precise meaning of this expression has been a matter of dispute, but it is 
considered that a whole sector should not be excluded14, although others have talked about 
90% of trade being included. This poses the problem of the agricultural sector,  protected 
under the CAP. Would agriculture have to be included to achieve a WTO-compatible FTA? 
Would the EU accept the opening to competition of the agricultural sector, and, if so, under 
which conditions? The EU has in its own agenda for the reform of the CAP and the 
outcome of this process will be of fundamental importance for the ACPs and the 
negotiations of the REPAs. 
                                                 
13
 The loss in tariff revenues is estimated to be of around $7.5 billion for the ACP group. This 
amount of money would have to be provided in some way to the ACPs if REPAs are to succeed 
(Van Reisen, 1999). 
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     The results of the Millennium Round of the WTO could also be crucial for the future of 
the REPAs. The fact that negotiations of REPAs will probably coincide with WTO 
negotiations for the new trade round is considered a problem for some, who argue that most 
ACPs “do not have the capacity to engage simultaneously in the two sets of negotiations” 
(Eurostep, 2000). However the ACP and EU have made a commitment to work together to 
protect their interests in the international fora, such as the WTO (Article 39). 
    Trade in services is also considered, mentioning specifically Maritime Transport (article 
42) , Information and Communication Technologies, and Information Society (article 43). 
A chapter on “Trade-related areas” states the need to promote co-operation in the 
establishment and implementation of competition policy, protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Consumer Policy and Protection of 
Consumer Health, Standardisation and Certification, and to achieve a balance between 
trade and environment protection and trade and labour standards. In regard to labour 
standards, both parties recognise the authority of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) and mention particularly the right to collective bargaining, the abolition of forced 
labour, the elimination of the worst forms of child labour and non-discrimination in 
employment (Article 50(1)).A brief chapter (“Co-operation in other areas”) closes this trade 
title, stating the willingness of the parties to negotiate fishery agreements and the 
importance of food security (Articles 53 and 54). 
    The commodity protocols were also a matter of concern because of their incompatibility 
with WTO rules. As a result of the disputes about the Banana Protocol before the WTO the 
new agreement does not establish a new banana regime, but only recognises the importance 
                                                                                                                                                     
14
 In the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV, the Preamble states 
that the contribution of regional arrangements to world trade is “diminished if any major sector of 
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of bananas for many ACP countries and that its production and marketing will be improved 
through “all the means available under the arrangements of the Convention”15 without 
identifying the  mechanisms. The Rum Protocol expired in 2000 while the Sugar and the 
Beef and Veal  Protocols are attached to Cotonou as Protocol 3 and 4 of Annex V. 
    Part  4 of the Agreement deals with “Development Finance Co-operation”, and it is 
structured in four Titles - the General provisions, Financial Co-operation, Technical co-
operation and Procedures and management systems. Article 56 recognises the need to 
promote local ownership, reflect partnership and for a flexible approach that recognises the 
situation in each ACP State and ensures co-ordination, predictability, security, efficiency 
and consistency. The responsibilities of the parties are identified in Article 57; the ACPs 
have to decide the objectives and priorities which will serve as a basis in formulating their 
National Indicative Programmes and implement them. The ACP and the Community will 
establish the guidelines for co-operation and adopt the indicative programmes, monitoring 
and evaluating them, while the Community is solely responsible for the financial decisions. 
The programming process is structured as follows16; the Community and the ACP jointly 
elaborate a Country Support Strategy (CSS) containing an analysis of the political, social 
and economic situation of the  country and outline the medium-term development strategy 
of the country, stating priorities,  strategies and the expected financing requirements. A 
National Indicative Programme (NIP) builds on the CSS defining precisely the priority 
sectors or areas, the measures and operations to be undertake to attain the objectives, a 
timetable for its implementation and its review. The NIP is drafted by the ACP state 
                                                                                                                                                     
trade is excluded” (McMahon, 1997). 
15
 Article 2, Protocol 5 (“The Second Banana Protocol’) of Annex V. 
16
 Annex IV of the Agreement, “Implementation and Management Procedures”, Chapter I: 
“Programming (National)”. 
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concerned and adopted by common agreement between the state in question and the 
Community17. Reviews include an annual operational review of the indicative programme 
and a mid-term and end-of-term review of the CSS and the NIP. In the light of the mid-term  
and end-of-term review the Community can alter the initial resource allocation according to 
the needs and performance of the ACP state. This is one of the main innovations in  the 
agreement, which has been called a ‘rolling programming’ and was opposed by the ACPs. 
Through the assessment of performance and the allocation of funds the Community will 
attempt to promote and encourage the attainment of objectives that it considers important 
and good practice in its management. Thus aid has lost its automatic character; when an 
initial sum is allocated to a country for a five year period this amount is no longer an 
entitlement, but an indicative figure. Needs and performance criteria have been agreed 
between the ACPs and the Community. Needs criteria  are per capita income, population 
size, economic and social development indicators (Human Development Index), level of 
indebtedness, export earnings losses and dependence on export earnings. Performance 
criteria include  progress in the implementation of institutional reform, the use of resources 
by the country, the effective implementation of current operations, poverty alleviation or 
reduction, sustainable development measures, macroeconomic and sectoral policy 
performance. A new body, the ACP-EC Development Finance Co-operation Committee, 
has been established to annually assess if the objectives of this co-operation are being met, 
if there are implementing problems and how to solve them (Article 83). 
                                                 
17
 Chapter 2 of Annex IV deals with the programming procedure at regional level. The process is 
similar to the national one, but establishing Regional Support Strategy (RSS) and a Regional 
Indicative Programme (RIP). The Community will specifically support in this context the regions that 
have decided to negotiate REPAs with the EU. 
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    The allocation to each country will comprise two elements; one for macroeconomic 
support, sectoral policies, programmes and projects, and another complementary fund to 
cover “unforeseen needs such as emergency assistance where such support cannot be 
financed from the EU budget, contributions to internationally agreed debt relief initiatives 
and support to mitigate adverse effects of instability in export earnings”18. The Parties have 
also agreed to co-operate in debt relief issues, providing the Community resources, 
assistance and training to deal with the problem of indebtedness. 
   The number of instruments has been reduced. The new Agreement establishes an 
envelope for support for long-term  development that will be used to finance the NIPs; an 
instrument used to finance the support for regional co-operation and integration, and an 
Investment Facility to support enterprises and managed by the EIB. A whole chapter is 
dedicated to “Investment and Private Sector Development Support” (Articles 74 to 78) in a 
recognition of the fundamental role of the private sector and investment in the development 
process. 
    A new system is introduced to mitigate the losses caused by reductions in export 
earnings, substituting for STABEX and SYSMIN. If a countries agricultural or mineral 
export revenue represents more than 40% of  total export earnings (averaged over three of 
the four years preceding the application), they fall by more than 10% (2% in the case of low 
income ACPs) and it is accompanied by a 10% deterioration in public finances, as forecast 
for the following year, then the EU will provide additional aid. The new system has 
overcome one of the problems of  STABEX and SYSMIN since it is not limited to a 
particular number of agricultural and mineral products but may cover any good if it 
accounts for the qualifying percentage of export earnings.  
                                                 
18
 Article 3(2)b of Chapter 1, Annex IV. 
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    The amount of funding granted under the new Agreement for its first five years is 
indicated in the Financial Protocol (Annex I). The 9th EDF is established and more funds 
are provided from the unexpended resources from previous Funds, the EIB resources and, 
“where appropriate”, resources coming from the Community’s budget. The total amount is 
€15,200 million, with  €13,500 million coming  from  EDF9 and the remaining   €1,700 
million from the EIB. In real terms, the new EDF will be smaller than the previous one. The 
9th EDF will be distributed as follows; €10,000 million for the envelope for support of 
long-term development, of which €90 million will be for the Centre for the Development of 
the Enterprise (CDE), €70 million for the Centre for the Development of Agriculture (CTA) 
and a maximum of €4 million for the objectives of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly 
(Article 17). Regional co-operation and integration will receive €1,300 million, and the 
Investment Facility €2,200 million. The use of funding can only begin once the Agreement 
has been ratified, a process that will take approximately two years. 
 
III. An Assessment 
 
   As already observed, despite the trade preferences and assistance offered to the ACPs 
their economic performance has, in general, been unimpressive. The ACP's share of EU 
imports has declined from 6.7% in 1976 to only 2.8% in 1999 and they remain amongst the 
poorest countries in the world. Although much of the failure lies in the economic policies 
pursued by the ACP states themselves, part of the explanation can also be found in the 
weaknesses in EU aid and trade policy. Trade concessions have frequently excluded 
"sensitive products", that is products where strong EU vested economic interests would 
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suffer from enhanced competition from ACP suppliers. It is in these very products that 
ACP producers usually have a significant comparative advantage. The most conspicuous 
example of this problem is the operation of the Common Agricultural Policy. It is the 
Uruguay Round and the WTO which are making the major contribution to reducing this 
protectionism, but this broader move towards free trade is also undermining the relative 
preferences enjoyed by the ACP states under Lomé. For example, the ACPs exemption 
from the restrictions of the Multifibre Arrangement will be undermined by its phasing out 
by 2005 under existing EU commitments to the WTO. Further, it is WTO obligations that 
have come to represent the major challenge to the whole EU-ACP trade framework. Since 
the ACP group includes middle income developing countries the successor Cotonou 
Agreement has faced serious constraints if it is to be WTO compatible. Hence the EU is 
expecting REPAs for the middle income ACPs to emerge from the trade negotiations that 
Cotonou sets in train. 
    This approach has been reflected in the final Cotonou Agreement. "Economic and trade 
cooperation shall build on regional integration initiatives...a key instrument in the 
integration of ACP countries in the world economy"(Art. 35.2). Art. 29 advocates regional 
economic integration, with a movement towards free trade areas, customs unions and single 
markets amongst the ACPs, while Art. 30 encourages functional regional cooperation in 
such areas as infrastructure, water resources, health and education. However the EU's 
enthusiasm for the regional integration model of economic development may prove a little 
unrealistic. As they are heavily dependent upon import duties for tax revenues, movements 
towards regional free trade may have important public finance implications for many 
ACPs. There is also a failure to sufficiently recognise the distributional implications from 
economic integration. The losers from the structural adjustments required in the more 
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competitive economic environment of free trade areas are unlikely to be compensated by 
the level of transfers that the EU Member States have been able to support within the 
Community, nor is the level of EU assistance under Cotonou likely to prove sufficient. 
Attempts at customs unions/free trade areas amongst developing countries have often 
foundered on this issue. 
   The EU's clear expectation is that most middle income developing countries will 
conclude reciprocal REPAs by 2008. However some ambiguity remains, the Agreement 
recognising that "the parties reaffirm their attachment to ensuring special and differential 
treatment for all ACP countries" (Art. 35.3). Further, although "economic and trade 
cooperation shall be implemented in full conformity with the provisions of the WTO" this 
is qualified to "take account of the Parties' mutual interests and their respective levels of 
development" (Art. 34.4). Art. 37.6 also holds out the prospect of an examination of "all 
alternative possibilities" for those middle income ACP states who are not in a position to 
enter into a REPA and which offers "a new framework for trade which is equivalent to their 
existing situation and in conformity with WTO rules". This one Article embodies, but fails 
to reconcile, the central conflict at the heart of the debate about future trade arrangements. 
However the most likely fall back option for those middle income States that fail to agree 
REPAs appears, from the EU perspective, to be the General System of Preferences, which 
is currently available to all non-ACP developing countries.  
    Meanwhile the 39 low income ACP members will continue to receive the existing 
non-reciprocal trade concessions. However the EU has already offered tariff and quota free 
access for virtually all products from the 48 low income developing countries by 2005, 
undermining the value of the existing concessions. 
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    Thus the ACPs will be fragmented into three groups, with those negotiating REPAs into 
further regional groupings. However many of the ACPs believe that the move to WTO 
compatible regionalised reciprocal free trade can be challenged. In particular they argue 
that the WTO itself can be influenced by the demands of the developing countries to an 
extent that has not happened in the past. In particular the rules governing regional 
agreements may be subject to modification to allow for a greater degree of asymmetry. 
Significantly the REPA negotiations will be "undertaken at the level they consider 
appropriate and in accordance with the procedures agreed by the ACP group" (Art. 37.5), 
providing an important means of maintaining ACP solidarity in the face of the 
regionalisation pressures. 
   Whether within this new trade framework the ACPs will be able to sustain a unified 
approach to aid negotiations also remains to be seen. Aid is already allocated on a country 
by country basis through the National Indicative Programmes - to be supported by the 
development of country strategies. There is also an increasing emphasise upon regional aid 
- with an allocation of  €1.3 bn. in EDF9 - and specific references to the regional element in 
the assessment of national structural adjustment support (Art. 67.2). Thus a more 
differentiated approach to ACP aid seems more likely in the future with, at best, future 
Conventions providing only a broad framework within which regional groupings will 
negotiate their own trade and aid packages. The Cotonou negotiations were recognised as a 
challenge to the unity of the ACP group and that challenge has not gone away. 
    One of the significant innovations in the new Agreement is the emphasise upon the role 
of "non-state actors", viz. the private  sector, economic and social partners and civil society 
(NGOs and local community organisations)(Art. 4). The EDF can directly finance these 
"complementary" participants in the development process, but only with the approval of the 
 30
ACP government (Art. 58.2). This requirement may, in some important cases, frustrate 
their involvement. This is an important consideration since this approach has been 
interpreted as a reflection of the desire of the EU to develop alternative methods of 
delivering assistance to those parts of the population who, it is believe, have been neglected 
by their respective governments, or to overcome problems of inefficiency or corruption in 
the public administrations. Throughout the document the role of the private sector (Art.21) 
and a development strategy focused upon the creation of competitive markets (Art.20.1d) is 
emphasised. In regard to the activities of the government and the public sector, explicit 
commitments to human rights, the rule of law, democratic principles and good governance 
(Art.9) were required of the ACPs. These essential and fundamental elements will be 
central to the political dialogue and regularly monitored. The Agreement also specifies the 
mechanism to be followed in the case of breaches of these principles (Art. 96). However a 
distinction is made for good governance, the only fundamental element, where only 
"serious cases of corruption" constitute a violation. Although a mechanism is now in place 
to tackle the central problem of public corruption and inefficiency the consistent, 
transparent and relatively apolitical assessment of progress in these sensitive areas is likely 
to prove problematic for the EU and a sensitive issue in EU-ACP relations. 
    In assessing the Cotonou Agreement it is particularly useful to relate its features to the 
recent Commission papers outlining the principles of EC Development Policy (COM 
(2000) 212) and the Communication on Reform of the Management of External Assistance 
(2000). These two documents clearly identify the weaknesses of EU development policy 
and its implementation and provide a framework to ask the question - do the innovations in 
the new Agreement address the problems that have been identified? 
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    One of the principal criticisms offered of EU policy is its failure to distinguish clear 
priorities - "the lack of an overall Community strategy and the fact that the objectives of 
Community development policy are too numerous, too vague and not ranked in any away." 
(EC 2000a page 5). However both Cotonou and the statement on development policy 
clearly identify poverty reduction as the primary objective of EU assistance. But in the 
Agreement this is qualified - "consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and 
the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy" (Art. 1). The 
environmental demands of sustainability and of structural reform and enhanced 
competitiveness can all be accommodated in this statement. Article 3 (Annex IV) outlines 
the criteria to be applied in the allocation of funds on the basis of both "needs" and 
performance. "Needs" is broadly defined to include per capita income, population size, 
social indicators, indebtedness and export vulnerability. "Performance" again includes 
poverty reduction, but in addition institutional reform, efficiency in use of resources, 
sustainable development and macroeconomic and sectoral performance. Such ambiguity 
may be regarded as a sensible recognition of the trade-offs that will have to be made in the 
implementation of development strategies in the ACP states or as a politically expedient 
"get out clause" compromising the poverty reduction objective. Only experience will 
determine which of these views is well founded.  
   The statement of EU Development Policy also calls for coordination with other 
international donors and this is clearly reflected in the new Agreement. Art. 67.4 offers 
automatic qualification for Structural Adjustment Support to those ACP states whose 
reform programmes are "acknowledged and supported at least by the principal multilateral 
donors". 
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    Turning to the identified administrative weaknesses of EU aid Cotonou has included a 
number of innovations to address them. The number of aid instruments has been 
rationalised and refocused into two envelopes. One brings together all non-reimbursable aid 
and the other, the Investment Facility, risk capital and loans for the development of the 
private sector. STABEX and SYSMIN have been replaced by additional assistance within 
the NIPs (Art. 68), which themselves will be administered in a rolling programme of 
funding and review. Similarly the regional programmes will be included in the system of 
rolling programming and will be subject to a mid and end of term review. Provision has 
also been made in the Agreement for revision of the sector-based guidelines and the 
procedures for implementing the financial assistance. These changes will provide 
significant additional flexibility to respond to the changing circumstances and performance 
of each ACP. The outstanding funds from previous EDFs will now be consolidated into 
EDF9, assisting the process of disbursement and addressing one of the major criticisms of 
the EU aid programme. Cotonou also represents a further shift towards more general budget 
and sectoral support and away from project aid. Greater responsibility will now fall upon 
the ACP state themselves to identify and administer the funding for individual projects. 
They will be faced with absorbing €3.5 billion each year of EDF9. To this end the 
emphasise upon "capacity building" in the ACP's public administration becomes central. 
The EU may therefore develop a system which, over time, has a greater focus upon 
monitoring rather than direct implementation.  
    However the responsibilities of the EC for the development of Country Support 
Strategies and the involvement in the formulation of the NIPs and regional programmes, 
will still represent a substantial administrative burden for the EC. It is not apparent that the 
rationalisation of policy instruments and management procedures, and the attempts at 
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delegation of administration, both to the ACP states themselves and to EU Delegations 
within the ACPs, will answer the concerns that have been expressed as to the administrative 
overstretch that has been identified in the Commission's aid administration. Moving to a 
rolling programme of assessment and allocation must increase the administrative burden, 
while the increasing concern in the Member States as to the effectiveness of the 
Community aid programme is likely to lead to an increasing emphasise upon aid 
evaluation. The explicit commitment in Art.19.2 to "putting in place qualitative and 
quantitative indicators of progress" is symptomatic of this pressure. It is intended, for 
example, to publish an annual "Compendium of Reference Texts" identifying best 
development practices to inform the monitoring of the performance of the Agreements 
development programme. Although monitoring and evaluation is a shared responsibility 
with the recipient state (Art. 57.4 & Art. 33 Annex IV) it is unlikely that the EC will be able 
to abrogate prime responsibility given the substantial size of Community funds involved in 
this area of EU activity. 
    The evaluation of EC aid administration identified a particular problem with the role of 
the EC's humanitarian and emergency relief through its Humanitarian Office (ECHO). 
Although intended only to fund short-term relief ECHO has grown rapidly and been 
criticised for involvement in longer term development projects. Emergency assistance, 
provided by ECHO, is defined in the Agreement as "short-term rehabilitation and 
reconstruction.. creating the conditions for the resumption of development"(Art.72.3c). But 
"underlining the developmental nature of the assistance (it) may be  used exceptionally 
together with the indicative programme at the request of the State concerned" (Art.72.5). 
"Post-emergency action...may be undertaken with Community assistance..(to) ease the 
transition from the emergency to the development phase" (Art.73.1). Clearly the Agreement 
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fails to express a considered view by the EC on this question of the division of labour 
within its own administration but it is sufficiently flexible to accommodate whatever 
internal changes the EC finally decides to make. 
    The Cotonou Agreement continues with a separate EDF, at least for the first five years. 
However the EC has proposed the budgetisation of all EU aid. As the focus of aid has 
shifted towards the states of Central and Eastern Europe, in line with the EU's political 
priorities, and the number of budget lines has multiplied, there has been increasing pressure 
to regularise and simplify the budgeting process. However this will raise the important 
political issue of the different contributory basis of the EDF and the general EU budget and 
the different systems of political control. As early as 1973 the European Parliament had 
proposed the incorporation of the EDFs into the Community Budget, but this had been 
rejected by the Council of Ministers. Although the Commission includes the EDFs in its 
pre-budget proposals and the Parliament in its annual budget, control remains with the 
Member States. Budgetisation of the EDF would also expose ACP assistance more 
explicitly to competition for funding from other EU expenditure priorities and from aid to 
other developing countries. There is nothing in the Agreement which would prevent such a 
change after 2007, indeed the EU may argue that this is entirely an internal administrative 
matter for the EU and not subject to ACP consultation. 
    However there are also a number of important issues that remain to be negotiated under 
the aegis of the Cotonou Agreement. The replacement trade regime has already been 
mentioned, with the outcome uncertain for all except the low-income countries principally 
concentrated in Africa. The increasingly sensitive issue of migration and repatriation of 
third country nationals and stateless persons has also been left for future Community and 
bi-lateral negotiations (Art. 13.5ii.). The detailed administration of the rolling programme 
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of aid evaluation and funding has yet to evolve, all within the context of the pressures for 
reform of the Commission emanating from the Member States of the Community. The 
political dialogue focusing upon good governance and human rights has yet to begin in 
earnest, with an unknown outcome. Meanwhile the European Community's attention is 
turning to the challenges of monetary integration and expansion Eastwards. Thus the 
relationship that emerges between the EU and the ACP at the end of the term of the 
Cotonou Agreement is likely to be radically different from that which has been sustained 
for the last 40 years. 
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